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Original scientific paper 
Traditional static defect detection tools can detect software defects and report alarms, but the correlations among alarms are not identified and massive 
independent alarms are against the understanding. Helping users in the alarm verification task is a major challenge for current static defect detection tools. 
In this paper, we formally introduce alarm correlations. If the occurrence of one alarm causes another alarm, we say that they are correlated. If one 
dominant alarm is uniquely correlated with another, we know verifying the first will also verify the others. Guided by the correlation, we can reduce the 
number of alarms required for verification. Our algorithms are inter-procedural, path-sensitive, and scalable. We present a correlation procedure summary 
model for inter-procedural alarm correlation calculation. The underlying algorithms are implemented inside our defect detection tools. We chose one 
common semantic fault as a case study and proved that our method has the effect of reducing 34,23 % of workload. Using correlation information, we are 
able to automate the alarm verification that previously had to be done manually. 
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Istraživanje korelacija alarma na temelju detekcije statičkog kvara 
 
Izvorni znanstveni članak 
Tradicionalni alati za detekciju statičkog kvara mogu detektirati kvarove softvera i objaviti alarm, ali korelacije između alarma nisu identificirane i 
masivni nezavisni alarmi protivni su razumijevanju. Pomaganje korisnicima u verifikaciji alarma predstavlja veliki izazov postojećim alatima za detekciju 
statičke greške. U ovom radu mi formalno uvodimo korelacije alarma. Ako postojanje jednog alarma uzrokuje drugi, kažemo da su u korelaciji. Ako je 
jedan dominantni alarm jedinstveno povezan s drugim, znamo da će se verifikacijom jednoga također verificirati drugi. Na osnovu korelacije možemo 
reducirati broj alarma potrebnih za verifikaciju. Naši su algoritmi inter-proceduralni, osjetljivi na putanju i podesivi (scalable). Mi prikazujemo sumarni 
model postupka korelacije za računanje inter-proceduralne korelacije alarma. Osnovni algoritmi su implementirani u naše alate za detekciju kvara. Izabrali 
smo jednu uobičajenu semantičku pogrešku za analizu slučaja i dokazali da naša metoda rezultira smanjenjem radnog opterećenja za 34,23 %. Primjenom 
korelacijeske informacije možemo automatizirati verifikaciju alarma, što se ranije moralo raditi ručno. 
 





Traditional static defect detection tools can detect 
software defects [1 ÷ 4], e.g., null-pointer dereference 
(NPD), invalid arithmetic operations (IAO), and memory 
leak (ML), and generate independent atomic warnings 
automatically, but they do not take the influences among 
different alarms into account and identify the correlations 
among alarms [5]. In an actual software testing process, 
the verification of software warnings is still done manually 
while the code around the alarm can be complex 
sometimes and it is time-consuming. For the large newly 
developed software, hundreds, or even thousands of 
warnings are generated by tools, but generated reports are 
processed at a very low speed. Excessive warning 
generation and a large proportion of incorrect warnings 
may cause developers to reject the use of static analysis 
tools. Helping users in the alarm verification is a major 
challenge for current static defect detection tools [6, 7]. 
In this paper, we propose a framework for the 
investigation of the alarms, so as to help classify them by 
their correlations. We explore relationships among alarms 
for verification, show that a correlation can exist between 
alarms. Once we find these groups of alarms, we only need 
to check whether their dominant alarm is false positive or 
a real defect.  
Our goal is to provide support in the alarm 
investigation process, especially in how to reduce alarm 
identification burden. We propose an approach resorting to 
automatic, sound static analysis techniques to refine an 
initial abstract semantics by an alarm reported by our static 
analyzer. If another alarm does not take place in a refined 
semantics, we believe they are correlated. 
The contribution of the paper is both theoretical and 
practical. The details are in the following: 
 We provide two rigorous definitions of alarm 
correlation and abstract alarm correlation, and then 
prove the soundness based on abstract interpretation. 
 We propose an approach to automatically computing 
correlations based on forward analysis, state slicing 
and input constraint. Meanwhile, a sound alarm 
correlation framework is presented. It is general and 
applicable to any semantic-based static defect 
detection tools. 
 For the inter-procedural alarm correlation calculation, 
we present a procedure correlation summary model 
and describe a general technique for constructing and 
instantiating, which makes our approach distinguished 
from others. 
 A prototype of our framework is implemented as an 
extension to DTS [8 − 10], a general automatic static 
defect detection tool for GCC programs developed by 
ourselves. Preliminary experimental results are 
encouraging. We choose one common semantic alarm 
as a case study and prove that the approach can 
effectively reduce 34,23 % of the workload to identify 
all alarms. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 
2 gives one illustrative motivation example. Section 3 
presents the fundamentals of alarm correlation, 
introducing a procedure correlation summary model for 
inter-procedural alarm correlation calculation. Algorithms 
for computing alarm correlation are presented in Section4. 
In Section 5, we introduce the experimental results. 
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Related work and conclusion are presented in Section 6 
and Section 7. 
 
2 Motivating example and insight 
 
In this section, we show that a correlation can exist 
among alarms. We provide an informal overview of the 
various challenges faced with alarm verification while 
leveraging alarm correlations technique. We present main 
ideas at a semi-technical level using a motivation example. 
 
 
Figure 1 Three Alarms from httpd-2.4.4 
 
Fig. 1 shows an example of alarm correlations found 
in httpd-2.4.4. It presents how alarm investigation efforts 
are greatly reduced. These 3 alarms are reported by the 
static defect detection tool (DTS) and these correlation 
relationships are discovered automatically by correlation 
algorithms. 
In the program snippet (a) of Fig. 1, the procedure 
is summarized first with a return value 
 by the analyzer at line 359. At line 361 
and 362, two NPD alarms are reported. The variable 
s value is returned on line 367, and procedure 
 is summarized with a return 
value  by the analyzer. Then the 
 function is called to allocate the 
memory in other procedures (see the program snippet (b)) 
and the analyzer reports the alarm . However, in fact, 
the procedure will never fail to 
allocate memory, since in the case of httpd-2.4.4. If the 
allocation fails, a function is registered that gracefully 
shuts down the particular server process, and  
is in the process guaranteed to never return . So these 
3 alarms are all false positives. If they are reported 
separately, the end user will have to investigate them for 3 
times while the code around the alarm can be complex 
sometimes. 
Obviously, in procedure  
(Fig. 1(a)), if  is a false positive, the  will also be 
the one. We call them as the intra-procedural correlated. 
Meanwhile, has an inter-procedural correlation 
with , and  is the predominant alarm. If the 
predominant alarm is proved false, then others correlated 
with it are also false. So we only need to identify  
instead of all alarms, seeing that alarm correlation can 
improve the efficiency of warning verification. 
According to the analysis above, the key technical 
challenges facing alarm correlation concern two aspects. 
First, how to calculate the alarm correlation between two 
alarms with uniformity and accuracy, where indicates the 
isomorphic representation whatever alarms are false 
positives or true errors. Meanwhile, accuracy implies 
computational results are reliable. Second, how to 
construct a general-purpose procedure correlation 
summary for the inter-procedural alarm correlation 
calculation is a key issue. Our algorithm overcomes these 
challenges with the following insights. 
DTS analyzes programs based on a forward dataflow 
analysis and takes the external input into account in a real 
world program, which also might affect the results at a 
precise time in the execution.  dealing with these 
external inputs is based on over-approximating techniques. 
It is difficult to capture the impact of one alarm on another 
directly. In this study, we take the advantage of the ideas 
of external input constraints. More specifically, by giving 
two alarms α and β, we slice α's error state and treat the 
 at a program point as an external input, then 
get a refined semantic based on an assumed external input 
constraints. We just judge whether β is reported at the 
refined semantic. If β is reported, we call β is correlated 
with α. 
Each alarm's  might affect its procedures 
and its concrete call site contexts in two aspects: (1) the 
 in one call procedure might cause side 
effects to actual-parameters and global variables, (2) the 
 might affect the procedure’s return value, 
potential interrupt instructions, the caller’s dataflow and 
control flow. As a result, by concentrating on the above 
information, a unified procedure correlation summary 
model could be constructed, which can uniformly and 
precisely reflect the call effect of each alarm’s 
 in every procedure. 
 
3 Alarm correlation 
 
In this section, we first briefly describe the 
background of our static analysis which is the basis of the 
subsequent sections. In the following, concrete program 
semantics refers to trace semantics [11, 12], which 
observes the history of each possible computation step by 
step. Abstract semantics refers to any approximations of 
trace semantics. According to the research of the pioneers, 
one single cause of imprecision at some program point 
often leads to many false alarms in the code reachable 
from that program point later [6], so a single refinement 
typically eliminates many false alarms. Furthermore, the 
same root cause of a defect appears several times in the 
program. In this section, an alarm correlation notion was 
formally introduced to optimize static analysis reports, 




We describe a program with a transition system and 
assume that a procedure is defined by the data of a tuple 
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 .  stands for the set of program point of 
execution; denotes a finite set of variables;   denotes a 
set of values stored in the memory; a function  
describes the variables and values correspondingly, 
where . We usually write  for the set of 
execution states and  for the set of initial 
states,  where  are the entry program 
points. We should add a special error state  since real 
world programs may crash. We also consider inter-
procedural programs, that a control state is defined by a 
pair , where  is a calling function name and  a 
syntactic control point. A state in an inter-procedural 
program is a tuple in . 
The program semantics formalizes its behaviour and 
the precision of its description depends on the level of 
abstraction of the considered semantics and the level of 
abstraction domains over which the semantics is computed. 
An execution of a program is represented with a 
sequence of execution states, called as a trace; This 
semantics is accurate but not decidable in abstract 
interpretation semantics systems. The written  stands 
for the trace semantics of a program , including more 
detailed introduction of trace semantics see[11]. 
By giving a program and a safety property, we wish to 
either validate that the code respects the property, or find 
an execution path that shows how the code violates the 
property. The static analyzer over-approximates the set of 
reachable dangerous states and reports corresponding 
alarms. 
At a program point  of program , 
if , then, the static analysis tool reports 
an alarm , where  and  are the abstract semantics of 
 and   separately, is an error state function, 
and . 
Alarm is a major issue for end users. Indeed, when the 
analyzer reports an alarm, it could be either a false alarm 
or a real bug that should be fixed. Currently, the alarm 
investigation process mainly relies on the manual 
inspection of variants, partly with a graphical interface. 
This process turns out to be cumbersome, since even 
simple alarms may take days to classify [7]. In the rest of 
this section, we explore relationships among alarms for 
investigation. We define the notion of alarm correlation 
and abstract correlation. We also prove the soundness of 
the abstract correlation among these correlated alarms. 
Once we find these groups of alarms, we only need to 
check whether their predominant alarm is false positive or 
a real defect. 
 
B. Correlation Definition 
We first give the definition of  in 
concrete semantics, and formally introduce two notions 
 and , then prove the 
soundness based on abstract interpretation. Finally, this 
subsection gives the definition of 
, which establishes the basis 
for the following implementation in our static analyzer. 
 In program , if a static analysis 
tool reports two alarms  and  respectively from  
and  along a trace  of , , suppose alarm  
will never occur when alarm  does not occur, we say 
that  have a correlation relationship with , and write 
. 
In static analysis, real faults are often mixed with an 
overwhelming number of false alarms. By being given two 
alarms  and , there are two situations for alarm 
correlations: (1) if alarm  is always false alarm when 
alarm  is false alarm, we say that  is correlated 
with . We denote the correlation as , 
i.e. , 
, and (2) if alarm  is always real fault when 
alarm  is real fault, we say that  is correlated 
with . We denote the correlation as , 
i.e. ,
. 
Since the concrete alarm correlation is not computable 
in general, we use abstract alarm correlation which is 
sound in replacement of concrete alarm correlation. The 
idea is that if static analysis tools do not report the alarm 
 from the abstract semantics refined under the 
assumption that alarm  does not occur, we can say that 
 has a concrete correlation with . It is easy to notice 
that this is correct, because even though the refined 
abstract semantics is smaller than the original fixpoint, it is 
still sound abstraction of concrete semantics if the 
assumption holds. 
At some abstract domain, if we cut the error state, the 
static analysis tool will not report this alarm at this point in 
the program. In the rest of the section, we define the notion 
of state slicing and abstract correlation. We also prove the 
soundness of abstract correlation. 
 In the program , if a static analysis 
tool reports an alarm  at a program point , we can get a 
state slicing by slicing the error state at this program point . 
We can define the , 
we let  for the concrete error state at program point  
in the execution of the program,  denotes a concrete 
operation of error state slicing. 
Accordingly, we can define an 
:  , and 
we denote  for the sound abstract error state slicing 
operation. In the concrete practice, static analysis tools 
need to implement this abstract resection operation at 
some abstract domain. 
In a real world application, there can be a lot of 
external input, which also might affect the results at 
precise time in the execution of the program. Most present 
tools deal with these external inputs based on over-
approximation techniques. In this study, we take 
advantage of the ideas of external input constraints, 
treating the state slicing at a program point as an external 
input, and then get a  based on an 
assumed external input constraint. 
 In program , given a set of  program 
points: . An  program 
point is a function , mapping a program 
point to the set of values that may be read at this point. 
allows to select different inputs for different execution 
contexts at the same program point. The denotation of the 
input function δ is the set of traces 
,  
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and such traces satisfy the property that reading an input at 
label  yields a value in . 
We do not consider the real application of external 
input. Indeed, we slice the error states as a kind of external 
input constraints, replacing the original program semantics, 
denoted as  and  denotes 
a finite set of alarm program points, accordingly, input 
function  can be further described: 
. 
Consider the case where we slice 
the error states as a kind of external input constraints, the 
semantic  can be further refined, the refined semantic 
 can be presented as . Suppose 
 is a sound abstraction of , i.e. 
. 
  The abstraction of the 
 can be defined: , 
is a sound approximation of , i.e. 
. 
Since concrete correlation is not computable in general, 
we use an approximation correlation which is sound with 
respect to concrete correlation. The approximation of 
alarm correlation is based on   and 
. 
The static analysis tool reports 
two alarms  and  respectively from  and  along a 
trace  of , ,  denote an abstract correlation 
relationship between two alarms. Suppose , if 
and only if  is not reported by static analysis tool under 
the , i.e., if and only 
if , . The following 
proves the soundness of . 
Demonstrate: Suppose the static analysis tool reports 
two alarms  and , and . Conveniently, by 
the definition of , then 
. By the definition of the abstract 
interpretation, we can see , so we 
can get . Based on the definition of 
, it is easy to see that 
. So is a 
sound abstraction of . 
 
 
Figure 2 Defect detection and alarm correlation of 3 alarms 
 
Taking the procedure  as an 
example (Snippet (a) of Fig. 1), the process of defect 
detection and alarm correlation is shown in the following 
Figs. 2(a) and 2(b). In the left of Fig. 2(a), there are two 
alarms reported (  and ) at node (2) and (3) 
separately in the procedure , 
because the variable  contains a  value. In the 
left of Fig. 2(b), when we slice the  value of , 
the alarm will not be reported at node (2), also at node (3). 
So, we can say that npd1 has an intra-procedural 
correlation with npd2, which denotes as npd1  npd2. 
C. Inter-procedural alarm correlations 
 achieves both path-sensitive intra-procedural 
analysis and context-sensitive inter-procedural analysis. 
 addresses inter-procedural problem by introducing a 
unified symbolic procedure summary model and describes 
a general technique for constructing and instantiating. 
What information to capture in each procedure summary 
has been carefully tuned so that the summary should not 
lose any common defect-related behaviour? Because of 
limited space, we do not explain our  inter-procedural 
analysis, see [8, 10] for details. 
 
(1) Procedure correlation summary model 
As shown in the right of Fig. 3(a), although the 
procedure summary technology has been successfully used 
in , it does not take the influence among alarms into 
account between two procedures. Such as in Fig. 3(b), we 
slice the error state in parallel when  is reported at the 
node (2). It becomes even more obvious that the 
 affects procedure 
's return value and the caller 
's dataflow value in the right of figure 
3 (b). To be specific, if the return value of 
 is , the value of 
 is also  in 
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. So, we can say that  have an 
inter-procedural correlation with , which is denoted 
as . 
As discussed in Section 2, an alarm’s state slicing 
might affect its procedure and further lead to two types of 
call site context transformation, which corresponds to two 
aspects of our . In a 
specific invocation to procedure , there is a set of alarms 
 reported. The construction of our alarm 

























cc d,erintd,QI                    (3) 
 
 means that the 's error state 
slicing  in one callee procedure might cause side effects 
to actual-parameters and global variables. We consider the 
error state slicing  as a kind of external input constraints, 
the domain of parameters and global variables can be 
further refined, the  means the 
parameters and global refined domain information. 
 and  indicates 
that the 's error state slicing  might affect the 
procedure return value and potential interrupt instructions 
respectively. The  and  are the 
refined information of return value  and interrupt 
information  accordingly. Each procedure is 
summarized by convergent fixpoint iteration based on 
abstract interpretation, so the analyzer can naturally handle 
arbitrary call cycles from direct or indirect recursive calls. 
 
(2) Correlation summary instantiation 
We now show how to perform context-sensitive 
correlation summary instantiation at concrete call sites. 
Consider a procedure call , and we have got the 
correlation summary of callee . The call site context 
( ) consists of all dataflow information right before the 
procedure call sites. While encountering   at call site , 
the precise summary is extracted by comparing  
and the conditional constraints binding with the summary. 
Then we leverage the refined correlation summary in two 
different manners: (1) if the summary information is 
concrete deterministic abstract domains, we will update 
the call site context using these fresh dataflows for 
subsequent detection and (2) if the summary is represented 
by some symbolic expressions, we employ the reversed 
mapping function to decide which symbol should be 
substituted by the actual parameter, and the dataflow 




4 Computing alarm correlation 
 
As shown in the above section, we need to calculate 
the abstract alarm correlation to reveal the concrete 
correlations between alarms which are reported by static 
analyzers. Our approach has three major phases. In the 
first phase, we employ a data flow analysis to update the 
state information and refined state information at one node 
of a . The phase of state 
updating is shown on the top side of Fig. 3. Next, we run 
defect detection, and if the static analysis tool reports an 
alarm, we will go to the final phase and run the alarm 
correlation computing. We simulate the propagation of the 
new state along one trace to determine its impact on the 
occurrence of other alarms. If the alarm reported at the 
second is not reported under the refined state information 
set, we report the alarm correlation information and slice 
out the error state at this alarm point where the alarm 
occurs. The goal of the third phase is to identify whether 
an error state that was removed at an alarm point can 
influence another alarm reported in the second phase. The 




Figure 3 The flowchart of our correlation algorithm 
 
Based on the above idea, we give a specific algorithm 
to calculate the alarm correlation in this section. We 
embed our alarm correlation algorithm in the process of 
defect detection. It takes as input a safety policy set and 
a . Our goal is to identify all the correlations for the 
alarms reported by our static analysis tool at each node 
on . We now describe these algorithms formally. 
High-level pseudocode for the correlation algorithms is 
given in the following. 
 
Algorithm 1 Compute Alarm Correlations 
Input: Defect finite State AutoMaton(DFSM) ; 
Control Flow Graph(CFG)   
Output: Alarms and alarms correlation information 
1. OUT[entry]: =dfsm{$start :⊥} 
2. set begin: =false, firstdefect: =true; 
3. set RefSemSet : =null; ˆ ( )
i
T n : =null; 
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4. for each n in N except entry do 
5.   call DefectDetection(dfsm,n); 
6.   if(begin) then 
7.     call DefectCorrelation(n,RefSemSet); 
8.  if (firstdefect) then 
9.    Stateslice(def), add ˆ ( )defT n  into RefSemSet; 
10.   set firstdefect: =false; 
11. end do 
 
In Algorithm 1, we set the state of  to  and 
set the  of  to (line 1) at the entry 
node of . In our static analysis tool, property state 
conditions are represented by abstract domain of variables, 
and infeasible paths can be identified when some 
variables’ abstract value range is empty. This method 
avoids the combination explosion of full path analysis by 
merging the conditions of identical property state at join 
points in the . Lines 2-5 initialize the abstract domain 
of variables , the slicing of abstract state , and 
refined abstract domain set , by setting 
them to . 
 
Algorithm 2 Compute abstract state 
Input: Defect finite State AutoMaton(DFSM) ; 
Control Flow Graph(CFG)   
Output: Abstract domain value 
1. procedure CallDomainSet(Node n){ 
2.  calulateIn(n); 
3.  calulateOut(n); 
4. } 
 
In Algorithm 2, the procedure  
applies a traditional data flow analysis to compute a 
prefixpoint of a decreasing chain. We get a previous 
abstract state by calculating the  of  and 
compute a new abstract state  at the -  
(line 2 and 3). 
 
Algorithm 3 Defect detection 
Input: Defect finite State AutoMaton(DFSM) ; 
Control Flow Graph(CFG)   
Output: Alarms information 
1. procedure DefectDetection(dfsm,n){ 
2.  call CalDomainSet(n); 
3.  update state conditions and remove contrary 
states; 
4.  if($error) then  
5.    report defect def; 
6.  if RefSemSet !=null then 
7.    set begin:= true; 
8. } 
 
In Algorithm 3, procedure  is 
one of the core functional components of our static 
analysis tool. The finite state machine is a formal 
description of defect patterns. States in the automaton 
correspond to typestates that dataflow variants can occupy 
during execution. A designated typestate  
corresponds to an erroneous state. Transitions in the 
automaton correspond to potential operations that might 
change the variant’s typestate. Once transiting to the  
state, there exists a potential defect. The 
 is a simple 
and common used model to extract semantics of the 
procedure execution. We transit the  states via the 
interval analysis results, until encountering the  state 
which indicates a potential defect, or transit to  the  
state while the destroy automatically. 
 
Algorithm 4 Abstract Correlations 
Input: Defect finite State AutoMaton(DFSM) ; 
Control Flow Graph(CFG)  
Output: Alarms correlation information 
1. procedure AlarmCorrelation(Node n, RefSemSet){
2.  for each ˆ ( )
i
T n  in RefSemSet do 
3.    call CalDomainSet(n); 
4.    DefectDetection(dfsm,n); 
5.    if not report defect def then 
6.      report defect correlation information; 
7.  end do 
8. } 
 
In Algorithm 4, procedure  is 
a process of calculating  at the 
abstract refined semantic (line 2). As 
described earlier, if an alarm  reported at the defect 
detection phase is not reported by the procedure 
(line 3) under the abstract refined 
semantic  with an alarm (line 5-6), we say 
abstractly correlates with  and is denoted 
as . 
 
5 Experimental results 
 
To evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency, we have 
implemented a prototype of this novel technique as an 
extension to , a static analysis tool developed by 
ourselves.  analyzes programs in four stages. First, 
source codes are preprocessed to an intermediate format 
by GCC compiler. Second, a compiler-front-end like 
analyzer generates the $CFG$ and procedure call graph. 
Third, at the same time with a symbolic interval analysis 
for generating variants’ abstract domain, we summarize 
each procedure and instantiate the callee summaries at 
concrete call sites. Finally, the  resolver detects 
potential defects along the control flow graph of the 
procedure, using the above dataflow information. In this 
section, we first present the experimental setup and show 
the results. Then, we analyze the results and give our 
experimental discussion. 
 
D. Experimental Setup 
We choose one type of common software warning 
null-pointer dereference and ten open source C projects 
with source code sizes ranging from several to hundreds of 
thousands of lines for evaluating our method, all of our 
experiments are done on a 2,4 GHz Intel Xeon Server with 
3 GB main memory, running Windows Server 2003. We 
measured running time using enough repetitions to avoid 
timer resolution errors. 
To quantify the efficiency and precision, the 
experiments are conducted in two different configurations. 
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The first configuration employs the original , 
whereas the second leverages our alarm correlation 
method. In Tab. 1, the  column indicates the total 
lines of source codes in all source files with suffixes ".c" 
and ".h", whereas the  entries indicate the total 
lines in the preprocessed files, generated by GCC 
preprocessor with ".i" suffix. The  and 
 entries respectively indicate the analyzing 
time consumption of original  and our alarm 
correlation method. 
The alarms point (in column ) indicates a 
potential defect, and the  entries represent the 
number of correlated alarms. The intra-procedural 
correlated alarms are listed in column  and the inter-
procedural correlated alarms are shown in Column . 
The correlated alarms are grouped by their predominant 
alarm. The statistic entries with the form ''%'' stand for the 
investigation decrement ratio after manually distinguished. 
Finally, we give a statistics on the last line. For the two 
configurations, we are more interested in whether some of 
the unknown alarm correlations could be detected by our 
alarm correlation technique at a very little consuming time. 
 
E. Experimentation Analysis and Discussion 
As shown in TABLE 1, according to the statistics, the 
1760 files contain over 0,65 million lines of source code (a 
parallel 5,4 million lines of intermediate code). All 
benchmarks were analyzed in 4,2 hours by our 
original , and reported 2810 alarms, comparison to 
4,57 hours by alarm correlation method with an average 
investigation decrement ratio . Generally, 
the results of two configurations deliver on their promises: 
the  was fast but the reported alarms are separate; 
the  reported 962 correlated alarms. Next, we 
will analyze the results of our alarm correlation method 
from the aspects of effectiveness and efficiency. 
 
Table 1 Results of comparison experiment 




% Original New Method Intra Inter Total
antiword-0.37 78 20,213 126,925 121 159 54 5 0 5 9,26 
barcode-0.98 18 3,409 19,591 34 44 17 1 0 1 5,88 
spell-1.0 6 1,991 4,847 5 6 40 9 2 11 27,50 
sphinxbase-0.3 120 22,517 157,332 196 224 285 37 12 49 17,19 
uucp-1.07 252 52,595 518,067 1575 1626 237 48 0 48 20,25 
sudo-1.8.6 191 56,866 207,123 360 399 103 12 2 14 13,59 
acpid-1.0.8 6 1,680 13,491 12 12 0 0 0 0 0 
ffmpeg-0.4.8 247 124,911 11,342 1717 1900 83 32 6 38 45,78 
git-1.8.2 468 164,500 2,998,401 6205 6565 144 1 0 1 0,69 
httpd-2.4.4 374 204,229 1,369,624 4902 5653 1847 725 70 795 43,04 
Total: 1760 652,911 5,426,743 15127 16588 2810 870 92 962 34,23 
 
Our alarm correlation algorithm turns out to be the 
most effective for ffmpeg-0.4.8 and httpd-2.4.4 (reduced 
by 45,78 % and 43,04 %) because of the following factors. 
First, these two projects both contain many dereferences of 
structure-typed variables. Second, it is common in these 
projects that valued dependencies of alarm-related 
variables propagate from callee to caller. For the example 
in figure 1, the structure-typed variable  (line 359) 
is dereferenced at line 361 and 362, and its value is 
returned at the end of function , 
which would further affect the callers. Our approach to 
resolve this problem is based on a unified procedure 
correlation summary model. 
Suppose that a tool reports 3000 warnings and each 
warning requires 3 minutes for inspection, the time to 
inspect all the warnings will take 18,75 uninterrupted 8-h 
workdays [13]. Originally without the improvements by 
alarm correlation, the 2810 alarms will take about 18 
workdays. Naturally, by applying our approach, there are 
962 correlated alarms outputted by the proposed algorithm 
with only 23 minutes, that is, we save one-third of the total 
time for identifying all alarms. In summary, the 
experimental results demonstrate that our alarm correlation 





6 Related work 
 
In this paper, we provide a support in the alarm 
verification process to identify correlate relationships 
between alarms and propose a framework for the 
investigation of the alarms produced by , so as to help 
classifying them by their correlations [13]. 
To help with diagnosis, Wei Le  [5] show that 
identifying a causal relationship among faults helps 
understand fault propagation and group faults of related 
causes. To our best knowledge, they are the first time to 
introduce the definition of fault correlation. By 
propagating the effects of the error state along the program 
path, they detect the correlation of pairs of alarms. 
However, Wei Le 's method is not sound, their 
method is based on symbolic execution techniques, they 
introduce an external constraint solver to resolve integer 
constraints stored in the query. Our method is based on 
abstract interpretation theory and sound. 
Rival proposed a method for the investigation of the 
alarms produced by their static analysis tool [6], so as to 
help classifying them as true errors or false alarms that are 
due to the approximation inherent in the static analysis. 
They refine an initial static analysis into an approximation 
of a subset of traces that actually lead to an error. If a 
combination of forward and backward refining analysis 
allows proving that this set is empty, they can conclude the 
alarm is false. In this paper, we do not check an alarm. 
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Indeed, we judge a correlation relationship between two 
alarms. 
Our work resembles to Lee 's work in the sense 
that both works refine the abstraction by exploiting the 
information about error state[14]. We are both trying to 
classify the alarms by their correlate relationship, but Lee 
's method is based on a super control flow graph. 
They cluster alarms based on a (not all) subset of possible 
dependencies, and if    at the program point , 
they will abandon the abstract refined alarm trace semantic 
 and alarm information about , which will end up 
with missing more correlation information. On the other 
hand, we perform an intra-procedural alarm correlation 
computing among all alarms in one procedure. Also, we 
introduce a  tag to record the alarm duplication in one 
procedure. If one alarm was reported many times, it will 
only be counted once. Our inter-procedural alarm 
correlation computing is based on an expanded unified 
symbolic procedure summary model. More details of our 




This paper addresses an important issue in the 
usability of static analysis tools: such tools tend to produce 
voluminous outputs and potential users are often dissuaded 
from using them because reviewing this output (warnings 
of different levels of severity) appears to be overwhelming. 
We present an approach that uses alarm correlation 
techniques to efficiently identify correlated warnings. Our 
approach is general enough to be applicable to any static 
analyzers based on abstract interpretation. The 
experimental results prove that our method has the effect 
of reducing 34,23 % of the amount of alarm identification. 
Using the correlation information, we are able to automate 
alarm identification that had to be done manually 
previously. In the future, we plan to optimize our alarm 
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